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Abstract 
 
As public concerns on sustainable economic development increase, an increasing 
number of manufactured products have found their environmentally preferable alter- 
natives. In this study, we propose an oligopoly game theoretical model to analyze the 
competition between the green and ordinary manufacturing sectors. We identify cost 
efficiency and innovative design as key elements to the survival of green products. We 
also find that the effectiveness of Pigouvian tax and subsidy policies depend on prod- 
uct characteristics, market structures, as well as targeted results. Our small empirical 
examples on Corolla vs. Prius and Incandescent lamp vs. Compact fluorescent lamp 
(CFL) show that our modeling results are more optimistic than real market statistics. 
We identify pre-equilibrium market dynamics, consumer bias towards green products, 
and modeling limitations as the main reasons for such differences. We also investigate 
the market competition and total societal welfare in the presence of tax and subsidy 
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1 Introduction 
 
In light of increasing public concerns about the environment and sustainable eco- 
nomic development, an increasing number of products have found their environmentally 
preferable alternatives. Green products or environmentally preferable products are de- 
fined as “products or services that have a lesser or reduced effect on human health 
and the environment when compared with competing products or services that serve 
the same purpose.”(Executive Order 13101, 1998). Examples of green products in- 
clude compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), which use 75% less energy than incandescent 
bulbs (Energy Star, 2008), organic foods, which are grown and processed without an- 
tibiotics, pesticides, or synthetic fertilizers (Environmental Protection Agency, 2008), 
hybrid gas electric vehicles such as the Toyota Prius, which achieves a fuel economy of 
48 city-mpg and 45 highway-mpg, and uses significantly less fuel than the comparable 
conventional vehicles (Toyota, 2008), and green hotels, which have reduced usage of 
water, energy, and materials (Sharkey, 2008). Being environmentally preferable does 
not necessarily imply public acceptance or a significant market share for environmen- 
tally friendly products. In competing with ordinary (non-green) products, some green 
products perform well while others have not achieved their expected level of success 
(Stoneman et al., 1995; Wong et al., 1996). 
Literature Review: There have been several studies on the competition between 
ordinary and green products. Chen (2001) considers the case of a monopoly producer 
who designs and produces ordinary and green products. The author concludes that de- 
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tion between two firms that determine the environmental attributes of their products, 
and then engage in a price competition. The paper suggests that there exist multiple 
Nash equilibria with varying levels of social welfare, and that properly imposed taxes 
and subsidies could lead to socially efficient equilibria. Here Nash equilibrium refers 
to a stable state of a non-cooperative game in which no player can benefit from unilat- 
erally deviating from. Mahenc (2007) finds that when consumers lack full information 
about the environmental quality of products, green products tend to be over-priced to 
send a signal of being clean. Corbett and Muthulingam (2007) use probability mod- 
els to study the motivation of 442 LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design) certified buildings. They find that a combination of signaling and pursuit of 
intrinsic benefits can explain the observed adoption pattern. 
Competitiveness of Green Products: Most green materials, equipment, and 
production processes cost significantly higher than ordinary ones, which usually leads 
to a heavy green price premium. Although encouraging consumer preference for green 
products have been reported in many surveys (Cramer, 1991; Jones, 2007), few con- 
sumers are willing to compromise performance, quality, or price in their purchasing 
behavior in exchange of ‘greenness’ (Athavaley, 2007; Nyborg et al., 2006). Second, 
although consumer awareness of green products has been increasing, a large number 
is still unfamiliar with green products or their economic and environmental benefits 
(Sandahl et al., 2006). For example, the Energy Star program was created in 1992, 
but it was reported that in 2004 only 56% of the American public could recognize the 
Energy Star label (Energy Star, 2008). Third, some green products fail to perform as 
well as promised and disappoint green consumers. This can be partially attributed to 
false or misleading green marketing claims that have impaired the reputation of green 
products as a whole. Consequently, this has raised consumers’ concerns about whether 
the green price premium they pay is really worthwhile (Dickler, 2008; Mendleson and 
Polonsky, 1995). In addition, the link between green purchasing decisions and measures 
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green products, “extreme care must be taken to ensure that claims about products’ 
green credentials are based on solid foundations to prevent the inevitable consumer 
backlash.” The issue of green credentials is also addressed by Glaser (1999) in the con- 
text of green power markets. Morthorst (2000) proposes a green electricity certificate 
market in Denmark to secure the development of renewable energy technologies. 
Objective of This Study: In the paper, We propose an oligopoly model to study 
the competition between green and ordinary products. The objective of this study 
is two-fold: to provide guidelines for green producers to understand the underlying 
factors that determine the competitiveness of green products in the market, and to 
analyze and compare the effectiveness of tax and subsidy policies in promoting green 
products. In the model, two types of firms: ordinary production and green production 
are assumed to compete against each other in a Cournot fashion to maximize their own 
profits. Here Cournot competition refers to the economic model in which companies 
compete on the amount of output they produce, which they decide on independently 
of each other and at the same time. 
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 sets up a benchmark 
scenario in which only ordinary products exist in the market. The game theory model 
that studies the competition between green and ordinary products is introduced in 
Section 3, where the three market indices are also defined. Analysis of the model 
is detailed in Sections 4. Section 5 applies the models to two empirical examples and 
compares the equilibrium results with their real market performances. The effectiveness 
of Pigouvian tax and subsidy policies is studied in Section 6. The paper concludes with 
summaries and discussions in Section 7. 
 
 
2 Model for Typical Ordinary Product Market 
 
We start with a case in which green product penetration has not yet started, and only 
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The demand function for ordinary products is assumed to be QO = 1 (a−pO ), where 
QO and pO denote supply quantity and price of the ordinary product, respectively, and 
a and b are constants. The inverse demand function is pO = a − bQO . 
We assume that the price of a product consists of two components: the upfront 
price, ρO , received by the producing firms, and the consumption cost, λO , paid to a 
third-party, i.e., pO = ρO + λO . Since the consumption cost may be incurred over 
the product’s lifetime, λO denotes the present value of the consumption cost. Both 
economic consumption cost and environmental externalities could be incorporated into 
λO . Consider the Toyota Corolla, an internal combustion engine vehicle, as an example. 
The upfront price, ρO , of a 2008 Corolla is $17,570, the manufacturer’s suggested retail 
price (MSRP) (Toyota, 2008). If it consumes $125 worth of gasoline each month for ten 
years, then the present value gasoline consumption cost is 
),120 125αm−1 = $8, 758 
 
for α = 0.99. Based on the data from Lave and Maclean (2002), the emission cost 
is calculated to be $886.  Therefore, the consumption cost is λO  = $8,758 + $886 
= $9,644, and the total price of a Corolla is pO = ρO + λO = $26, 328. It is our 
assumption that consumers take both the upfront price and the consumption cost into 
consideration in their purchasing behavior. 
There are n firms that produce homogeneous ordinary products and compete in 
a Cournot fashion, which means that each firm i simultaneously and independently 
determines its quantity supply qO to maximize its own profit.  Let cO  be the unit 
 
production cost, then the profit of firm i is given by πO (qO ) = (ρO − cO )qO . 
i i i 
We define social welfare as consumer willingness to pay minus total cost (including 
consumption and production costs): 
 
Ψ := 
   
QO 
0 
(a − bq)dq − λOQO − cOQO = (a − λO − cO )QO − b (QO )2. 
 
This definition is equivalent to the summation of consumers’ surplus and producers’ 
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O 
O 
 
surplus: 
 
    QO 
0 
l 
(a − bq)dq − pOQO + (ρOQO − cOQO ) = 
   
QO 
0 
(a − bq)dq − λOQO − cOQO = Ψ. 
 
Since λO includes both economic and environmental consumption costs, the cost of 
environmental externalities is reflected in the above defined social welfare function. 
Proposition 1. Under Nash equilibrium of this model, the following system output 
can be derived: 
• quantity supply of firm i is (qO )∗ = a−λ  −c , ∀i = 1, ..., n, 
i b(n+1) 
• total price is (pO )∗ = a+n(λ +cO ) , and 
n+1 
• social welfare is Ψ∗ = n(n+2)(a+λ −cO )2 . 2b(n+1)2 
 
The above results can be derived by setting ∂πi 
i 
= 0. 
 
 
3 Competition Model for Market with both Or- 
dinary and Green Products 
Here we study the market competition after the penetration of green products. Vari- 
ables defined in Section 2 with the superscript “O” replaced by “G” are the correspond- 
ing notations for green products. Section 3.1 describes the demand functions of the 
two products, Section 3.2 defines three market indices. Settings of the market model 
with both ordinary and green products are given in Section 3.3. 
 
3.1 Demand Functions 
 
After the penetration of green products, the demand functions of the two products are 
O 
O 
O 
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assumed to take the following form: 
  
QO   = 
  
a 1 − θG   
   
1 1 −θG pO    
 
 , (1) 
 
QG 
 
b(1 − θOθG)  
− 
 − b(1 − θOθG)  −θO 1   
pG 
 1 θO 
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whose inverse demand functions are 
 
    
pO a 
    
1 θG QO   =   b  
   . (2) 
 
pG 
  
a 
 − 
 
θO 1   
QG 
 
 
Here θO, θG ∈ (0, 1) are substitutability parameters. Unlike Singh and Vives (1984) 
who assume that substitutability parameters take the same value in both directions, 
we allow the values of θO and θG to be different. If θO '"" 1 (θG '"" 1), it means that 
an ordinary (a green) product is almost a complete substitute to a green (an ordinary) 
product. A negative value could imply complementarity of two products, whereas 
θO '"" 0 (θG '"" 0) indicates that an ordinary (a green) product is neither substitutive 
nor complementary to a green (an ordinary) product. Since we are considering two 
versions (ordinary and green) of the same product, the values of θO and θG are assumed 
to lie between 0 and 1. To interpret θO and θG mathematically, we observe that 
 
∂QO (pO, pG) 
∂pO 
:
 
∂QG(pO, pG) 
∂pG 
:
 
∂QO (pO, pG) G 
∂pG = −1 : θ ∂QG(pO, pG) O 
∂pO = −1 : θ 
 
, (3) 
 
, and (4) 
QO (pO, pG = pO ) : QG(pO, pG = pO ) = (1 − θG) : (1 − θO ). (5) 
 
Equation (3) means that the impact of pG on QO is a fraction, θG, of that of pO on 
QO . In other words, if a higher price of ordinary products, pO + ∆p, reduces the sales 
of ordinary products by ∆QO , then a lower price of green products, pG − ∆p, reduces 
the sales of ordinary products by θG∆QO . Equation (4) is symmetric to Equation (3). 
These two equations indicate that the more substitutive one product is to the other, 
the more impact its price has on the sales of the other. Equation (5) shows that when 
green and ordinary products are priced the same, their demand ratio is determined by 
θO and θG. Therefore, the ratio (1 − θG) : (1 − θO ) measures relative attractiveness of 
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∂∆p 
G 
 
3.2 Market Indices 
 
We use the following three indices to measure the performance of green products in 
the market. 
Market share of green products 
 
The market share of green products is defined in terms of units of products sold: 
 
βG  := 
Q 
. 
QG + QO 
 
 
Green price premium 
 
From the inverse demand functions (2), the price of green products can be written 
as pG = pO + ∆p, where 
 
∆p := b(1 − θO )QO − b(1 − θG)QG 
 
is the total green price premium. Intuitively, a higher total green price premium 
will cause more demand of ordinary products ( ∂Q
O 
> 0) and less demand of green 
ones ( ∂Q
G  
< 0). The upfront green price premium is given by 
 
∆ρ := ρG − ρO = b(1 − θO )QO − b(1 − θG)QG − λG + λO. 
 
Social welfare 
To define social welfare for a product with two differentiated versions, we con- 
struct two non-decreasing functions fG(t) and fO (t) such that they are contin- 
uously differentiable in  (0, 1)  and  that  fG(0)  =  0, fG(1)  =  QG  and  fO (0)  = 
0, fO (1) = QO . Functions fG(t) and fO (t) represent the process of price discrimi- 
nation, where the supply quantities of green and ordinary products are gradually 
increased in such a way that consumer willingness to pay is maximally exploited. 
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2 
2 
2 
 
The consumer willingness to pay can be calculated as: 
 
   1 
Υ    = {a − b[fO (t) + θGfG(t)]}dfO (t) + 
0 
   
1 
{a − b[fG(t) + θOfO (t)]}dfG(t) 
0 
=   a(QO + QG) − b [(QO )2 + (QG)2] − bθG 
   1 
fG(t)dfO 
0 
(t) − bθO 
   1 
fO (t)dfG 
0 
(t) 
=   a(QO + QG) − b [(QO )2 + (QG)2] − bθGQOQG + b(θG − θO ) 
0 
fO (t)dfG (t). 
 
By the definition of fO (t), we have 
 
   1 
fO (t)dfG(t) ≥ 
0 
   
1 
0dfG(t) = 0, and 
0 
 
   1 
fO (t)dfG(t) ≤ 
0 
   
1 
QO dfG(t) = QOQG. 
0 
 
Since the functions fO (t) and fG(t) are selected to maximize Υ, it becomes 
 
Υ = a(QO + QG) − b [(QO )2 + (QG)2] − b min{θG, θO}QOQG. 
 
Subtracting total cost from Υ, we get the social welfare function: 
 
Ψ := (a−λO −cO )QO +(a−λG−cG)QG− b [(QO )2 +(QG)2]−b min{θG, θO}QOQG. 
(6) 
We assume a − λO − cO > 0 and a − λG − cG > 0 so that a positive social welfare 
is achievable. 
 
 
3.3 Model Settings for Market with both Ordinary and 
Green Products 
   1 
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are n ordinary firms, which specialize in producing ordinary (green) products; there 
are m green firms, which specialize in producing green products and no firms produce 
both (realistically if there are firms producing both types of products, the products 
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i 
i 
O O G G 
 
are typically produced in separate departments and are also competing in the market). 
Firms compete in a Cournot fashion, and each firm competes against all other firms 
both within and outside its own group. 
Denote qO as the supply quantity of an ordinary firm i and qG as the supply 
 
quantity of a green firm j. The total supply quantities of ordinary and green products 
are given by QO = 
),n qO and QG = 
),m qG, respectively. Unit production cost of 
i=1 i j=1 j 
an ordinary product is cO and the unit production cost of a green product is cG. 
 
 
4 Analysis of the Model 
 
 
4.1 Nash Equilibrium 
 
Given total supply quantities from the other ordinary firms QO 
 
= 
),n 
 
qO − qO and 
 
from green firms QG, the profit of an ordinary firm i is 
−i k=1 k i 
 
 
πO O O G 
i (qi ; Q−i, Q 
=   (ρO − cO)qO 
) (7) 
 
=   (pO − λO − cO)qO 
 
=   [a − b(qO + QO + θGQG) − λO − cO]qO 
i −i i 
=   −b(qO)2 + [a − λO − cO − b(QO + θGQG)]qO, 
i −i i 
 
 
and its best response is 
 
qO O G a − λ
O — c − b(Q−i + θ  Q ) 
i (Q−i, Q  ) = . (8) 2b 
 
Similarly the best response of a green firm j is 
 
qG G O a − λ
G − cG − b(QG + θOQO) 
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−j 
j (Q−j, Q  ) = . (9) 2b 
 
Proposition 2. Under Nash equilibrium of the market competition model with both 
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i O G 
j O G 
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green and ordinary products, the supply quantities of individual firms are 
 
O O G G G 
(qO)∗ = (m + 1)(a − λ  − c  ) − mθ  (a − λ  − c  ) ,  i = 1, ..., n, (10) 
b[(m + 1)(n + 1) − mnθ  θ  ] G G O O O 
(qG)∗ = (n + 1)(a − λ  − c  ) − nθ  (a − λ  − c  ) ,  j = 1, ..., m, (11) 
b[(m + 1)(n + 1) − mnθ  θ  ] 
 
and their profits are 
 
 
πO O 2 
i  = b(qi ) (12) 
 
πG G 2 
j = b(qj ) . (13) 
 
Equations (10) and (11) can be derived by first taking summation of (8) and (9) 
over i and j, respectively, 
 
QO n(a − λ − c ) − b[(n − 1)Q
O + θG mQG] 
i  = (14) 
2b 
QG m(a − λ − c ) − b[(m − 1)Q
G + θO nQO] 
i  = (15) 
2b 
 
and then substituting (14) and (15) for QO and QG in (8) and (9). Equations (12) and 
i i 
(13) can be derived by substituting (10) and (11) for qO and qG in (7). 
i i 
 
 
4.2 Long-Term Equilibrium 
 
We assume that the ordinary segment of the market has reached maturity in that the 
number of ordinary firms, n, is fixed, but there could be green firms entering or exiting 
the market with no barrier. 
Define η :=  πG as the relative profitability of a green and an ordinary firm.  If 
 
η > 1, then a green firm is more profitable than an ordinary one, and more green firms 
will be attracted to enter the market; if η < 1, then some green firms are expected to 
exit. Assuming that relative profitability is the only incentive for entry and exit, we 
O 
G 
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say that the market has reached long-term equilibrium when η = 1. Under long-term 
Nash equilibrium, πG = πO and thus qO = qG. 
i j 
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Proposition 3. Supply quantities under long-term equilibrium of the market competi- 
tion model with both green and ordinary products are 
 
O O G G G 
qO G (a − λ  − c ) − θ (a − λ  − c ) 
i  = qj  = 
,  i = 1, ..., n,  j = 1, ..., m, 
b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG] 
 
and the number of green firms is 
 
(n + 1)(a − λG − cG) − (nθO + 1)(a − λO − cO ) 
(a − λO − cO ) − θG(a − λG − cG) 
 
The following proposition derives the market indices under long-term equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4. Under long-term equilibrium of the market competition model with 
both green and ordinary products: 
1. market share of green products is 
 
G G O O O 
βG  =
 (n + 1)(a − λ  − c  ) − (nθ  + 1)(a − λ  − c  ) , 
(n − nθO − 1)(a − λO − cO ) + (n − nθG + 1)(a − λG − cG) 
 
2. total and upfront green price premiums are 
 
∆p = cG + λG − cO − λO  and ∆ρ = cG − cO, 
 
and 
 
3. social welfare is 
m = . 
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(a − λO − cO ) − θG(a − λG − cG) 
b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG] (a − c
O − λO )n 
(n + 1)(a − λG − cG) − (nθO + 1)(a − λO − cO ) 
b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG] 
n2[(a − λO − cO ) − θG(a − λG − cG)]2 
− 
2b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG]2 
(a − cG − λG) 
[(n + 1)(a − λG − cG) − (nθO + 1)(a − λO − cO )]2 
− 
2b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG]2 
n min{θO, θG}(nθO + 1)(a − λO − cO )2 
b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG]2 
n min{θO, θG}θG(n + 1)(a − λG − cG)2 
b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG]2 
n min{θO, θG}[(n + 1) + θG(nθO + 1)](a − λO − cO )(a − λG − cG) 
− 
b[n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG]2 
 
From the long-term equilibrium results in Proposition 4, we derive managerial in- 
sights regarding the competition between ordinary and green products. 
Corollary 1. In order for green products to survive in long-term equilibrium (βG > 0), 
the following condition needs to be met: 
 
a − λG − cG 
a − λO − cO 
nθO + 1 
> . 
n + 1 
 
Corollary 1 is derived by setting the green product market share βG > 0. Corollary 
1 points out that, unless green technology is sufficiently advanced to make cG and 
λG small enough, and green design is sufficiently distinct from ordinary products to 
make θO small enough, green products will eventually be eliminated from the market. 
The pure electric vehicle Insight may be such an example, in which case technology 
improvement was not able to bring prices low enough to attract demand and high 
enough to generate a profit, and thus, Honda had to discontinue its production (Lave 
and Maclean, 2001). 
. 
Ψ   = 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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from the market in long-term equilibrium (βG < 1), the following condition needs to be 
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met:  
a − λG − cG 
a − λO − cO 
 
 1 
< 
θG 
. 
 
The remainder of the Model I analysis is based on the following blanket assumption: 
 
nθO + 1 
< 
n + 1 
a − λG − cG 
a − λO − cO 
 1 
< 
θG
 
 
. (16) 
 
From Corollaries 1 and 2, this assumption ensures the existence of both ordinary and 
green firms in the market under long-term equilibrium. 
Corollary 3. When all other conditions are equal, it is easier for green firms to survive 
as the number of ordinary firms, n, increases. 
This is because the minimal condition for green firms to survive becomes weaker as 
 
n increases:  
 ∂     nθO + 1 
 
 
 
 
∂n n + 1 
1 − θO 
= − 
(n + 1)2 
 
 
< 0. 
 
As a special case, if the ordinary product market has reached perfect competition with 
infinitely many producers, then it will be the easiest for green firms to survive the 
market competition, and by Proposition 3 the green product market will also reach 
perfect competition eventually with infinitely many producers. 
Proposition 5. Under long-term equilibrium of the model with only ordinary products, 
the difference in upfront prices equals the difference in production costs: ρG − ρO = 
cG − cO. 
 
Proposition 5 reveals that no matter how much savings green products have over 
ordinary ones in consumption cost, under long-term equilibrium, the upfront green 
price premium will only represent the difference in production costs. 
Proposition 6. Compared to the Nash equilibrium of the model with only ordinary 
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products, long-term equilibrium of the market model with both ordinary and green prod- 
ucts has a lower price of ordinary products and a higher social welfare. 
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    ∂(index)   
∂(parameter) θO 
I 
total green price premium ∆pI 
upfront green price premium ∆ρI 
social welfare ΨI 
− 
0 
θG 
+ 
0 
cO 
+ 
−1 
−1 
+/− 
cG λG n 
market share of green products βG − −   
1 1 0 
0 0 
+/− 
1 0 
− − − 
0 
 
+ 
2   ∂β 
 
Proposition 6 shows that one of the contributions of the penetration of green prod- 
ucts is that, as long as they can survive in the long term, they will make the market 
more competitive and force ordinary firms to reduce their prices, which will also in- 
crease social welfare. 
 
4.3 Comparative Statics 
 
We study the sensitivity of long-term equilibrium to changes by deriving comparative 
statics of the market indices with respect to the parameters θO , θG, cO , cG, λG, and n. 
Proposition 7. Under long-term equilibrium of the market model with both ordinary 
and green products, the following comparative statics can be derived: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ∝ [(λG + cG) − (λO + cO )] 
The following observations and insights can be drawn from Proposition 7: 
 
1. ∂βG ∂βG 
∂θO  < 0, ∂θG  > 0: In order to increase the market share, green products should be 
designed such that θG is large and θO is small, which means that, by Equation (5), 
they should be preferred over ordinary products when economic considerations 
are removed. 
G 
∂cO   > 0: Increasing production cost of ordinary products (by imposing taxes, 
e.g.) will increase the market share of green products. 
 
3.  ∂β
G ∂βG 
∂cG  = ∂λG  < 0: Reducing production and/or consumption costs of green prod- 
ucts (through technology improvement) will increase their market share. 
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4.  ∂β
G ∂n ∝ (λ
G + cG) − (λO + cO ): If green products are less cost efficient (λG + cG > 
λO + cO ), then reducing the number of ordinary firms will only decrease the 
market share of green products. 
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∂cG   = 
∂∆ρ 
 
5.  ∂∆p ∂∆ρ 
∂cO  = ∂cO  = −1: Every dollar of tax on ordinary products will be entirely passed 
on to reduce the green price premium ∆p and ∆ρ. 
 
6.  ∂∆p ∂cG   = 1: Symmetric to the above point, every extra dollar of savings in 
production cost, ∆cG, will be entirely passed on to reduce the total green price 
premiums ∆p and ∆ρ. If we look at the effects on prices of green and ordinary 
products separately: 
 
∂pG ∂ρG n(1 − θOθG) + 1 
∂cG 
= 
∂cG 
= 
n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG > 1, and 
 
∂pO ∂ρO θG 
∂cG  
= 
∂cG  
= 
n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG  > 0. 
The effect on pG and ρG is more than the change in cG itself, but pO and ρO are 
also positively affected, which makes the changes in price premiums, ∆p and ∆ρ, 
equal to the change in production cost, ∆cG. 
7.  ∂∆p ∂∆ρI 
∂λG    = 1, ∂λG    = 0:  An extra dollar of savings in consumption cost will only 
be passed on to reduce the total green price premium, but not upfront price 
premium. The effects on prices of green and ordinary products are, respectively, 
 
∂pG n(1 − θOθG) + 1 
∂λG 
= 
n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG > 1, 
 
∂pO θG 
∂λG  
= 
n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG  > 0, and 
∂ρG ∂ρO θG 
 
 
8.  ∂Ψ
G 
∂λG  
= 
∂λG  
= 
n(1 − θOθG) + 1 − θG . 
∂θO  < 0: The level of social welfare increases as ordinary products become less 
substitutive to green ones. Qualitatively speaking, this is because the definition of 
social welfare in (6) favors more distinct products. In an extreme case when θO '"" 
0, green products are completely non-substituted by ordinary ones, thus their 
penetration will create an entirely new segment of green consumers, significantly 
contributing to social welfare. On the other extreme when θO '"" 1, green products 
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9.  ∂Ψ 
= ∂Ψ 
∂n 
 
have no features to distinguish themselves from ordinary ones in terms of design 
or functionality, then they cannot attract new consumers except converting some 
existing ones from ordinary to green, thus social welfare before and after green 
product penetration will be almost the same. One example of the latter case is 
green power (Wiser et al., 1999; Wiser and Pickle, 1998). Some consumers may 
switch from ordinary power suppliers to green suppliers, but will not consume 
more electricity just because it is generated from renewable resources. 
G 
∂θG   < 0 or > 0: Symmetric conclusion cannot be made for θ . This is because 
the number of ordinary firms, n, is assumed to be fixed, but that of green firms 
is not. An increased θG could improve green products’ competitiveness, attract 
more green firms into the market, and have a positive effect on social welfare. 
This positive effect may or may not offset the negative effect of making the two 
products more similar to each other. 
∂ΨG 
∂cO > 0 or < 0: Increasing c
O could make green firms relatively more competi- 
tive, attract their entries, and have a positive effect on social welfare, which may 
or may not offset the negative effect of decreasing ordinary firms’ cost efficiency. 
∂ΨG 
∂cG 
G 
∂λG  < 0: Increasing green products’ production and consumption costs 
will decrease social welfare. 
12. ∂Ψ
G > 0: By Corollary 3, increasing the number of ordinary firms makes it easier 
for green products to survive, thus increases social welfare. Dean and Brown 
(1995) have a similar discussion on how pollution regulations may deter new 
(ordinary) firms’ entry and suggest that such regulations “may have the socially 
undesirable consequence of decreasing competition.” 
 
 
5 Numerical Examples 
 
A firm’s decision to initiate green production is influenced mainly by regulations and 
consumer preference (Wong et al., 1996). The disappointing low market share of some 
earlier green products, however, has forced firms to reconsider their green marketing 
10. 
11. 
G 
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strategies (Peattie, 2001). Several studies have focused on consumer profile and its 
implication on advertising strategies (Roberts, 1996; Rowlands et al., 2003; Stevels 
et al., 2001). 
In this section, two empirical examples are presented to demonstrate the Oligopoly 
model and derive managerial insight for the market competition and government policy 
impacts. 
• Corolla vs. Prius 
In this example, we use the internal combustion engine vehicle Toyota Corolla 
2008 as an ordinary product, and the similar sized hybrid gas electric vehicle 
Toyota Prius 2008 as a green product. Since the vehicle production costs are 
proprietary, we make the following assumptions. The production cost for Corolla 
is assumed to be 85% of its MSRP, $17,570 (Toyota, 2008); thus cO = $14, 935. 
Prius was said to cost far more to make than its sticker price (Jones, 2003; Lave 
and Maclean, 2002). Taking into account rapid technology improvement in the 
last few years, we assume that its production cost is the same as its MSRP, 
$21,760; thus cG = $21, 760 (Toyota, 2008). 
Total consumption costs consist of gasoline costs and emission costs. Gasoline 
costs are calculated based on a gas price of $3/gallon, combined fuel economy 
of 30 mpg for Corolla, 46 mpg for Prius, and a ten-year 150,000-mile lifetime. 
The monthly gasoline cost for Corolla is $125; from the calculation in Section 2, 
the total discounted gasoline cost is $8,758. The total discounted gasoline cost 
for Prius is $8,758×(30/46)=$5,712. Based on the data from Lave and Maclean 
(2002), the emission costs of Corolla and Prius are calculated to be $886 and 
$440, respectively. Therefore, λO = $9, 644, λG = $6, 152. 
 
A survey could be used to empirically determine the values of θO and θG based on 
the interpretations of Equations (3)-(5). For the purpose of numerical illustration, 
we subjectively assign that θO = 0.95 and θG = 0.98. According to Equation (5), 
this translates to an assumed preference ratio of 2:5 for Corolla and Prius under 
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the condition that they are indifferent in terms of upfront price and consumption 
cost. Prius is assigned a higher substitutability due to the fact that it has been 
rated the top car in owner satisfaction as reported by the Consumer Reports 
Car Owner Satisfaction Survey in 2204-2008 (Consumers Reports, 2008). The 
value of θG is not set equal to 1.0 because concerns have been raised that hybrid 
gas electric vehicles like Prius may be too quiet, imposing a potential threat to 
pedestrian safety (Chang, 2008). 
Although the sales of Prius have been continuously and strongly increasing since 
its entry into the U.S. market in 1999, Prius’s fuel savings and lower emissions 
could not justify its higher upfront price (λG + cG > λO + cO ). This example 
could represent some green products that are not (yet) necessarily superior to 
their ordinary counterparts economically, but are more attractive in non-economic 
perspectives. Organic foods and renewable electricity may be also such examples. 
• Incandescent lamp vs. CFL 
In this example, we use the incandescent lamp as an ordinary product and the 
CFL as a green product. Sandahl et al. (2006) report lessons learned from many 
years of efforts to increase market acceptance of CFLs, which had only about 2% 
of the national market in 2006 in terms of unit sales. In their report, technical 
complexity, market availability, and the attitudes of consumers, manufacturers, 
and retailers are identified as some of the barriers to larger acceptance. 
The production costs of an incandescent lamp and a CFL are assumed to be 
cO =$0.35 and cG =$2.1, respectively. Energy costs are used as the consumption 
costs, which are obtained from the Savings Calculator on the Energy Star (2008). 
For an incandescent lamp, λO = $77, and for a CFL, λO = $15. Since complaints 
and concerns still exist on CFLs’ performance (Sandahl et al., 2006) such as shape, 
dimming compatibility, light quality, and mercury usage, the substitutability pa- 
rameters are subjectively set to be θO = 0.99, and θG = 0.91, translating to an 
assumed preference ratio of 9:1 for incandescent lamps and CFLs when economic 
factors are not considered. 
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This example could represent some green products that have significant long- 
term economic and environmental benefits but have other undesirable features. 
Reusable shopping bags may be such an example. 
For both examples, we assume that n = 40, a = 10(cO + λO ), b = 0.0001a. The 
data for the two examples are summarized in Table 1. Using these data, we calculate 
long-term equilibrium of the market competition model with both green and ordinary 
products. The equilibrium results are summarized in Table 2. It should be noted in 
Table 2 that the green price premium ∆p for the incandescent lamp vs. CFL example 
is negative. This is due to significant long-term economic and environmental benefits 
of the CFL. The result illustrates that if the full economic and environmental benefits 
are fully recognized by the consumers, the total cost over the life cycle of a CFL is 
$60.25 less than that of an incandescent lamp. Since the two examples of products 
are studied on different lifetime horizons, their social welfare values should not be 
compared to each other. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Data for Numerical Examples 
 
Ordinary vs. Green product λO λG cO cG θO θG 
Corolla vs. Prius $9,644 $6,152 $14,935 $21,760 0.95 0.98 
Incandescent lamp vs. CFL $77 $15 $0.35 $2.1 0.99 0.91 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Results of Numerical Examples 
 
Market competition Market share of Green price premium Social welfare 
Long-term equilibrium green products β ∆p/∆ρ Ψ 
Corolla vs. Prius 49.85% $3,333/$6,826 $1.01B 
Incandescent lamp vs. CFL 89.78% –$60.25/$1.75 $3.70M 
 
 
 
 
 
Total sales of Corolla and Prius in 2007 were 371,390 and 181,221, respectively 
(Toyota/Lexus/Scion Pressroom, 2008), which yields a market share of 33% for Prius, 
compared to the 50% estimate from the models. The Energy Star web site reports that 
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Energy Star CFL sales accounted for approximately 20% of the light bulb market in 
the United States in 2007, which is far less than the 90% estimate from the models. 
We give the following explanations for the differences: (1) market shares for both Prius 
and CFL have been continuously increasing in the past few years. There is still space 
for the products to further develop and for the market to approach equilibrium. This 
is especially true with the production cost reduction. (2) Some consumers may be 
unaware of or have doubts about green products’ benefits, which could shrink their 
market share potentials. (3) Some real market characteristics may require much more 
sophisticated models to capture. (4) Assumptions have been made on certain data that 
are not publicly available, which may also introduce errors to the modeling results. 
 
 
6 Pigouvian Tax and Subsidy 
 
Since green producers are internalizing some of the negative externalities during the 
production process, it is appropriate for the government to subsidize such environmen- 
tally responsible effort and offset part of the extra cost. The government not only has 
huge purchasing power (Environmentally Preferable Purchasing, 2008) but also can 
exercise regulatory leverage to foster green product development. The Energy Policy 
Act (2005), for example, has been providing tax credits for consumers who purchase 
fuel efficient cars (Solheim, 2007).Taxes may also be imposed on ordinary production 
as a penalty for the negative externalities. 
Much research has focused on the effectiveness of regulatory policies such as im- 
posing emission taxes on ordinary products and giving subsidies to green products to 
encourage environmentally responsible production. Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) 
compare the uniform ad-valorem tax policy with a variant policy that levies taxes or 
offers subsidies based on a firm’s environmental quality level. Their results show that 
“while a uniform subsidy policy improves average environmental quality, a uniform tax 
policy worsens it. Further, while a discriminatory subsidy policy reduces total pollu- 
tion and enhances aggregate welfare, a discriminatory tax policy may increase total 
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pollution and may reduce aggregate welfare.” More recently, Bansal (2008) finds that 
tax (subsidy) is more effective when the damage parameter is low (high). Pigouvian 
tax is shown by Mahenc (2007) to fail to improve social welfare in a market with asym- 
metric information about the greenness of products. Eichner and Pethig (2000) use a 
mathematical model to compare five different tax policies in reducing environmental 
externalities. Turner et al. (1998) survey green taxes in the late 1990s in the context 
of waste management policies and emerging policy instruments. While green taxa- 
tion could improve environmental quality if appropriately designed and implemented, 
they find that it could also cause undesirable consequences due to multiple and pos- 
sibly conflicting policies introduced during the political process. The attractiveness 
of three options of green taxes to the public was recently surveyed (Athavaley, 2007). 
Results show that majority of people support the federal mandate policy that stipu- 
lates exactly how firms should reduce emissions. The other less attractive options are 
“a government-imposed tax on greenhouse-gas emissions, and a cap-and-trade scheme 
where the government requires emissions cuts and issues firms permits allowing them 
to emit a certain quantity of greenhouse gases.” 
We consider the Pigouvian tax ∆cO  > 0 (subsidy ∆cG  > 0) applied to ordinary 
(green) products, which increases (reduces) the unit production cost to cO + ∆cO (to 
cG − ∆cG). The effects of taxation policies on the market indices under the oligopoly 
model are analyzed in Sections 6.1. Based on the theoretical and numerical results, rec- 
ommendations of taxation policies and managerial insights are summarized in Section 
6.2. 
23  
2 
 
6.1 Impacts of Taxation Policies to the Market Competi- 
tion 
Effects on market share of green products 
 
Relating to the results from Section 4.3, we obtain 
 
∂βG O O 
 
 
∂cG 
∂βG 
∂cO 
a − λ  − c   
= −
a − λG − cG , 
 
which means that imposing tax and subsidy have different effects on market share 
of green products. If green products are less cost efficient (λG + cG > λO + cO ), 
then giving one dollar of subsidy increases the market share of green products 
more than imposing one dollar of tax does. 
 
 
Effects on green price premium 
 
From the observation points 9 and 10 in Section 4.3, one dollar of tax on ordinary 
products (or subsidy on green products) will reduce the green price premium, ∆p 
or ∆ρ, by exactly one dollar. 
 
 
Effects on social welfare 
 
Under taxation policies, social welfare should also include any government revenue 
through collecting taxes and paying subsidies: 
 
Ψ   =   (a − cO − λO )QO + (a − cG − λG)QG − b [(QO )2 + (QG)2] (17) 
−b min{θG, θO}QOQG + ∆cOQO − ∆cGQG. 
 
The effects of tax and subsidy on social welfare are presented using the two 
numerical examples. 
For the Corolla vs. Prius example, the zero-tax-and-zero-subsidy policy is found 
to be optimal in terms of social welfare maximization. 
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For the Incandescent lamp vs. CFL example, the effects of different tax and sub- 
sidy policies are shown in Figures 1, in which optimal tax-subsidy combinations 
lie on the line segment ∆cG + 0.98∆cO  = $3.7; ∆cG, ∆cO  ≥ 0.  We also con- 
sider the case in which θG increased from 0.91 to 0.915, representing an improved 
preference ratio from 9:1 to 8.5:1. Under such scenario, the optimal tax-subsidy 
policy combinations become milder: ∆cG +0.98∆cO = $1.9; ∆cG, ∆cO ≥ 0, which 
is illustrated with Figures 2. 
 
The differences between the analysis results of both products relate to the produc- 
tion costs and market profiles. The analysis framework presented in this paper 
illustrates the flexibility of applications in a variety of products. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Social Welfare Maximizing Taxation Policies for the Incandescent Lamp vs. CFL 
Example with θG = 0.91: ∆cG + 0.98∆cO = $3.7; ∆cG, ∆cO ≥ 0. 
 
 
6.2 Recommended Taxation Policies 
 
Based on the discussions in Sections 6.1, we summarize in Table 3 our recommended 
taxation policies for improving the market indices of the two examples. 
To increase the market share of green products, a dollar of subsidy is more effective 
than a dollar of tax for those green products that are less cost efficient (λG + cG > 
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Figure 2: Social welfare maximizing taxation policies for the Incandescent lamp vs.  CFL 
example with θG = 0.915: ∆cG + 0.98∆cO = $1.9; ∆cG, ∆cO ≥ 0. 
 
Table 3:  Recommended Taxation Policies for Numerical Examples 
 
 Market share of 
green products β 
Green price premium 
∆p/∆ρ 
Social welfare 
Ψ 
Prius subsidy either neither 
CFL tax either combination 
 
 
λO + cO ) such as Prius. For CFL and other more cost efficient green products, tax is 
recommended over subsidy. To reduce the green price premium, both tax and subsidy 
are equally effective: one dollar of tax or subsidy will reduce green premium by exactly 
one dollar. This result holds true for all green products regardless of their costs or 
design characteristics. 
From the perspective of maximizing social welfare, the zero-tax-and-zero-subsidy 
policy is recommended for Prius, whereas a range of heavy tax and subsidy policies 
are found to be optimal for CFL: ∆cG + 0.98∆cO = $3.7, which would tax ordinary 
products and/or subsidize green products for more than their production costs. While 
we realize these policies are impractical, they demonstrate a point that it is in the 
society’s best interest to promote the highly cost efficient CFLs (with comparable 
quality), especially when public preference is relatively low compared to incandescent 
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lamps (θG < θO ). 
Besides tax and subsidy, there are other regulations that could be used to promote 
green products. The Energy Independence and Security Act (2007), for example, sets 
efficiency standards for electric lights that will see the incandescent lamps phased out 
of the US market beginning in 2012. As another example, on June 1, 2008, China 
banned manufacturing, selling, or using ultra-thin plastic bags as a means to call for a 
return of cloth bags and to cut “white pollution” (Bodeen, 2008). 
 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
An oligopoly model is proposed in this paper to study the competition in the mar- 
ket with both green and ordinary products. We derive insights for green producers 
to increase competitiveness of their products and for decision makers to use taxation 
policies as leverage to promote green products. The modeling framework is compre- 
hensive enough to capture some of the key characteristics of the market and tractable 
enough to provide managerial insights. We explicitly model how consumers base their 
purchasing decisions on not only price premium of green products but also the savings 
in consumption cost. The savings include both economic savings (of reduced energy 
cost by using Energy Star appliances, for example) and environmental savings (of re- 
duced emissions by driving hybrid gas electric vehicles). Just as firms did not start to 
produce green products to protect the environment but to explore a new market and 
increase their profit (Smith et al., 1996), most consumers are willing to pay a green 
price premium only if their purchase is rewarded with extra benefits. Advances in 
technology and manufacturing processes have enabled many green products such as 
CFLs to justify their price premium by significant savings. 
The oligopoly model is an extension of the monopoly or duopoly settings in most 
literature in this area (Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003; Bansal, 2008; Chen, 2001; 
Conrad, 2005; Mahenc, 2007). As such, they allow us to examine the interactions 
among two groups of producers with possible entries and exits. Minimal conditions 
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are derived for green products to survive market competition. Compared to their 
ordinary counterparts, most green products are superior in one dimension but weaker 
in another, at least in the introductory phase. The survival conditions could help 
producers to determine whether a green product is ready to enter the market and 
survive the competition. Cost efficiency and innovative design are identified as key 
elements to survival. 
Three market indices are defined to measure the market performance of green prod- 
ucts: market share of green products, green price premium, and social welfare. The 
first two indices are easier to measure, and are generally good indicators of green prod- 
ucts’ performance: a larger market share and a lower green premium imply a greater 
consumer acceptance. The third index embraces a societal perspective and takes into 
account consumers’ and producers’ surpluses as well as government revenue. The so- 
cial welfare index provides a legitimate objective function for taxation policy makers 
to maximize. 
Two empirical examples: Corolla vs. Prius and Incandescent lamp vs. CFL. are 
presented to illustrate the approach. Market share results from both models are more 
optimistic than real market statistics. We identify pre-equilibrium market dynamics, 
consumer bias towards green products, and modeling limitations as the main reasons 
for such differences. We analyze the effectiveness of tax and subsidy policies that can 
be applied to influence the performance of green products, and recommend product 
specific policies for improving different market indices. 
We conclude the paper by pointing out several future research directions. First, we 
assume linear demand functions in this paper. More sophisticated demand functions 
can be incorporated to study more complicated consumer behaviors. Second, this 
paper focuses on taxation policy from the government. It would be interesting to 
analyze market response to non-taxation environmental regulations and policies, such 
as cap-and-trade. Third, as the green technologies evolve, companies will create various 
level of greenness for products. It will create not two but many versions of products 
with a (may be) continuous spectrum of greenness.  It would be of interest to study 
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how the market responds in this process. 
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